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Within a global networked environment, security aspects
have become more and more important and access control
at network borders is considered essential. For this pur-
pose firewall systems are used which provide a well-estab-
lished security mechanism to restrict the exchanged traffic
to a certain subset of users and applications. In order to
cope with the increasing demand for new applications, a
firewall must be flexible and extensible to support such new
applications and their protocols. RSVP is a dynamic sig-
nalling protocol, which has been invented to negotiate
resource requirements between end systems and a packet-
based communication network. In this paper, we investi-
gate the interoperation of RSVP with a firewall system in
order to support new applications in a generic way. We
show how the resulting system flexibility allows for a vari-
ety of employment scenarios and incremental deployment
of such a technology. We back up our claims by describing
a prototype that we have implemented.
1.  Introduction
A firewall examines all network traffic between the con-
nected networks. Only data that is explicitly allowed to, as
specified by a security policy, is able to pass through [1]. In
addition to the inspection of data flows, some firewalls also
hide the internal network structure of an organization.
From the Internet, the only visible and therefore attackable
network system is the firewall. This is achieved by the use
of Network Address Translation (NAT) [2] mechanisms.
The appropriate treatment of the data that is demanded by
the security policy, depend on the application and/or the
protocols that are used. Therefore, the firewall has to be
instructed on how the data has to be treated for each appli-
cation. Two general problem domains have to be solved for
each application, according to the basic functionality of a
firewall:
• Opening and closing paths through the firewall based on
security checks.
• Appropriate implementation of the NAT functionality.
The tasks of a firewall are well defined, but there are
many possible firewall architectures to fulfil them. Fire-
walls may consist of packet filters, “stateful filters”, proxies
or a combination of all these components. In addition, the
applications itself may interact explicitly with a firewall to
support the firewall to fulfil their tasks.
RSVP, initially designed and described in [3], has been
specified by the IETF [4] to carry reservation requests for
packet-based, stateless network protocols such as IP (Inter-
net Protocol). In the RSVP model, senders inform RSVP-
capable routers and receivers about the possibility for res-
ervation-based communication by advertising their ser-
vices via PATH messages. PATH messages carry the
sender’s traffic specification (TSpec) and follow exactly the
same path towards receivers as data packets. Receivers ini-
tiate reservations by replying with RESV messages. They
contain a TSpec and a reservation specification (RSpec)
and establish the reservation.
2.  Motivation and Outline
An explicit interaction between applications and fire-
walls is necessary, when a general method to add support
for new applications within a firewall needs to be available.
Especially for the integration of complex and dynamic
applications, like multimedia applications, such a general
method is desired. To build the interaction between the
application and the firewall normally a “firewall frame-
work” is used. In this paper, we show that the existing
RSVP architecture can be used to build such a firewall
framework. The resulting firewall framework has not to be
defined and implemented from scratch, but instead a lot of
already existing work can be reused. To explain this fact in
detail, we give a general model of a firewall framework.
This allows us to show which parts of a firewall framework
are already covered by RSVP and which parts have to be
added or modified. As we show, modifications of RSVP are
not necessary for basic scenarios. RSVP can be “used” as
firewall framework.
The next section gives a definition of a firewall frame-
work. In Section 4, we show how RSVP is used to build
such a firewall framework. Afterwards, we discuss the nec-
essary boundary condition, the security of RSVP itself. In
Section 6, we clarify the functionality of our approach by
describing the overall signalling process on the basis of an
example application. Section 7 gives an overview of related
work and links our new approach to previous work. We
close the paper with a summary of the presented work.
3.  Firewall Architectures
Before we define how RSVP can be used as generic fire-
wall framework, we clarify the difference between a fire-
wall using a framework and a firewall that does not. Then
we identify which parts are necessary within such a firewall
framework in general.
3.1 Definition of a Basic Firewall
A firewall has to support a set of basic tasks, to properly
handle application communication. These basic tasks can
be classified in the following manner:
T 1. Opening and closing paths through the firewall based
on (security) checks.
T 1.1 The firewall checks which hosts are involved
in the communication (e.g. by determining source
and destination IP-addresses).
T 1.2 The firewall has to determine the service used
(e.g. by analyzing the UDP or TCP ports).
T 1.3 The firewall has to know about the communi-
cation dependencies and has to adjust its configura-
tion dynamically (e.g. relationship of several flows
that form one session).
T 1.4 The firewall determines the users that are
involved in the communication (e.g. by authentifica-
tion of a user within a proxy).
T 2. Implementation of the NAT functionality
T 2.1 NAT is implemented by modifying the IP-
Addresses in layer 3 and for TCP and UDP, the ports
in layer 4.
T 2.2 For some applications, modifications of the
higher layers are necessary. (e.g if IP-addresses are
negotiated and submitted in high layers during com-
munication).
In the next sections, we use the term basic firewall to
refer to a firewall or firewall system which is capable to
execute the tasks listed above. Not all of these tasks are
performed by all types of firewall components (filters,
stateful filters, proxies). For example a packet filter does
not support the Task 1.4 and NAT. Standard firewalls how-
ever are able to execute all of the mentioned tasks. Some of
these firewalls might provide additional tasks (e.g. virus
checking) but these are not included in our definition of a
basic firewall. Every firewall, using a framework or not,
should support the tasks of a basic firewall.
3.2 Grouping of Logical Parts
For some of the described tasks of a basic firewall a fire-
wall needs some information, that is normally not available
to network nodes. Therefore, the firewall has to interact
with the application or its protocols. Figure 1 shows the
logical parts that can be grouped to build different levels of
interaction between application and firewall.
The part Application Control is responsible to extract the
information (e.g. owner of the data) from the applications
communication that is necessary for the firewall. This
information are then passed to the Firewall Control. The
Firewall Control is responsible to handover this informa-
tion to the security device (e.g. a packet filter device). The
appearance of this information depend on the used security
device type (e.g. commands to configure a specific packet
filter device).
Combination ¬ in Figure 1 shows a “state of the art”
firewall, where the application does not interact directly
with the firewall to help the firewall performing its tasks. In
this case, all logical parts are located on the firewall itself.
The Application Control is designed as protocol parser
within the firewall. The information extracted by the Appli-
cation Control is then passed via function call to the Fire-
wall Control which is also located on the firewall. The
Firewall Control then executes the appropriate firewall
configuration commands.
When a firewall framework ­ is used, the Application
Control is part of the application. The necessary informa-
tion is passed by the application to the Application Control,
so that a parser is not necessary. Then the information is
passed to the Firewall Control which is located on the fire-
wall. Since the application is running on a different
machine than the firewall, a mechanism to transport the
information over the network is needed. The Firewall Con-
trol then executes the appropriate firewall configuration
commands.
It is also possible to group the logical parts in other ways.
Combination ® in Figure 1 shows an intermediate proxy
between the application and the firewall.
The main difference between combination ¬ and ­ is
given by the generality of the approaches. In the first
approach, the firewall needs to interoperate with a parser.
This parser must have knowledge of the internal structure
of the application protocols, and therefore a parser for each
application is necessary. The first approach could be con-
sidered to be more secure, due to the granularity of the pos-
sible checks in the specialized parser and the missing
interaction with other network components. In the second
approach, the firewall support has to be integrated in the
application, but the firewall has not to be modified for
every new application. There is a trade off between security
Figure 1 - logical parts of a firewall




signlalling partpolicy part policy part
and generality, which has to be considered.
A firewall framework consists of the following two main
parts:
• The transportation of the necessary information between
applications and the firewall. We refer to this part of a
framework as the signalling-part.
• The definition, how these informations are created in the
applications (Application Control) and how these infor-
mations are used in the firewall (Firewall Control). We
refer to this part of the framework as policy-part.
Both parts have to interact in a way that the resulting
framework can handle the tasks of a basic firewall. The
design of each part has an impact on the design of the other
part.
3.3 Security Concerns
If a firewall framework is used to replace specialized
firewall components, like an application level gateway,
there is some functionality that could not be covered. An
application level gateway or proxy compromises special-
ized parsers for the supported applications. These parsers
are capable to perform security checks on the application
layer. For example an FTP application level gateway can
filter certain ftp commands like GET or PUT, an HTTP
application level gateway can remove ActiveX or java
applications from the transferred documents. There is a
trade-off between “extended security features” and “gen-
eral application support”.
4.  An RSVP Based Firewall Framework
Firewalls can use RSVP in two different ways. First, a
firewall is also a router and therefore could use RSVP in
the same way as normal QoS aware routers. In case that the
flow’s packets are not simply forwarded but checked by
some application code on the firewall, the resources to be
reserved are not only network resources but local compo-
nents as well. Hence, mechanisms such as CPU scheduling
and memory management must be considered [5]. This
usage of RSVP is related to classical QoS which also con-
siders the specific behavior of a security component. The
details of network and local resource management are out
of the scope of this paper. The second method, how a fire-
wall can use RSVP, is to use it as signalling protocol for
security QoS requests. A desired security level can be part
of a QoS specification [5] as well. This method of using
RSVP is discussed within this paper.
4.1 Definition
To avoid the need of implementing and installing a new
parser everytime a new protocol has to cooperate with the
firewall, we propose the “Firewall RSVP Framework”. We
suggest to use RSVP to transport the necessary information
between applications and the firewall. RSVP is used in this
framework to implement the signalling part and the policy
part.
The application has to announce every upcoming stream
by sending a standard RSVP PATH message which repre-
sents the Application Control in the policy-part. The mes-
sage contains a description of the upcoming flow, e.g.
protocol, source, destination. These information are used
by the firewall to implement the appropriate mechanisms,
representing the Firewall Control within the policy-part.
Because these steps are performed for each flow, the fire-
wall does not have to analyze flow dependencies or flow
characteristics of an application session to support the tasks
1.1 to 1.3. Thereby, the signalling-part uses the standard
RSVP signalling mechanisms, as they are also used for
QoS purpose. We define this operation mode as the passive
mode where existing information in the RSVP messages is
interpreted for security purposes within the firewall. To be
able to fulfil also the necessary Task 1.4, the signalling part
has to use an active mode. Within the RSVP PATH mes-
sage an additional object has to be inserted by the applica-
tion, which contains information about the flow’s owner.
This can be achieved by using the already defined
POLICY_DATA-object.
To match the NAT requirements specified in task 2. (Sec-
tion 3.1), the active mode might be used as well, but this is
not discussed within this paper.
As we have shown, two “operation modes” have to be
distinguished. Both modes can be used within a RSVP fire-
wall framework. When the passive mode is used, the stan-
dard RSVP signalling can be employed to control a firewall
supporting Tasks 1.1 to 1.3. To control a firewall which
supports all tasks of a basic firewall, the active mode has to
be used. To use the active mode, the RSVP signalling has to
be enhanced which is well feasible due to the modular
design of RSVP.
This paper investigates both operation modes. We show
how these two operation modes can be used to build a
generic framework for the integration of new applications
within firewalls. Thereby, we primarily focus on the fire-
wall problem domain “Opening and closing paths”. The
problem domain “NAT functionality” is considered but not
be discussed in detail in this paper.
4.2 Preconditions
If RSVP is used as a firewall framework, some precondi-
tions have to be considered.
At least two of the involved nodes (one communication
endpoint and the firewall) have to support the RSVP proto-
col. Compared to other frameworks, as described above,
this results in the same implementation effort, but also
additional features are available. If external entities (appli-
cations, devices,...) can influence the configuration of the
firewall, a policy overlay is necessary. This means that an
administrator of the firewall should be able to narrow the
possible configuration changes that are signalled. For
example, an administrator wants to be sure that negotiated
flows are only enabled when they use not well-known
ports. This ensures that even in a worst case scenario a
basic firewall policy remains active. If RSVP is transport-
ing security related information, which is true when the
firewall configuration is based on the RSVP message con-
tent, it has to ensure that the protocol itself is secure.
Because this is the most important precondition, we discuss
this issue in detail in Section 5.
When these preconditions are fulfilled, the following
mechanisms have to be implemented to enable RSVP for
the targeted purpose.
4.3 Details
Figure 2 describes a simple scenario where an intranet is
protected by a firewall which uses the RSVP framework.
We refer to this scenario to describe the details of the
framework.
If Host A intends to initiate a flow to Host B it announces
this upcoming flow by sending a PATH message to HOST
B (¬). The firewall, which is capable to take part in the
RSVP signalling, processes and forwards the RSVP infor-
mation to host B. Host B replies with a RESV message
(®). This message is also processed by the firewall and for-
warded to host A.
4.3.1 Policy Part - Application Control. The applica-
tions have to announce all flows that are used by RSVP.
Therefore each application has to use the standard RSVP
mechanisms. If the firewall also requires user authentifica-
tion for the flows, the RSVP implementation also has to
support the POLICY_DATA-object as described in [6].
Applications have to implement a standard RSVP signal-
ling interface to provide the Application Control.
4.3.2 Policy Part - Firewall Control. To implement this
part of the framework, the firewall has to take part in RSVP
signalling. This could be achieved by adding a standard
RSVP daemon to the firewall. The used RSVP daemon has
to be slightly modified to be able to support the following
capabilities:
If host A initiates the communication (as described
above), the firewall uses the information in the PATH mes-
sage to implement a filter rule for the upcoming flow. If
host B initiates the communication, host B sends the PATH
message and host A responds with the RESV message. In
this case the information within the RESV message is used
by the firewall to implement the appropriate filter rule. As
described in Section 5, security mechanisms can be used to
authenticate the generator of RSVP messages. Because of
the hop by hop characteristic of RSVP, also the security
mechanisms are hop based. Therefore the firewall can only
trust RSVP messages that are passed by the host directly
without passing an RSVP hop and are passed from a hop
that is trusted by the firewall. These conditions can only be
satisfied by signed messages, containing firewall signalling
information, from internal and therefore trusted hosts.
Consequently either the PATH or the RESV message are
used to update the firewall configuration, depending on
who is the internal sender. A ConnectionCache is neces-
sary in the firewall, to control if the internal host has con-
firmed the communication request. The ConnectionCache
is a table which holds entries for each connection. It stores
source and destination addresses and ports as well as the
used protocol, the direction (internal or external) and the
status of the connection. The RSVP implementation within
the firewall has to distinguish internal and external gener-
ated messages
An RSVP message (PATH and RESV), generated by the
application to announce an upcoming flow, usually has the
appearance shown in Figure 3.
The protocol number, the destination port and destina-
tion address are included in the SESSION object. The
source port and source address are included in the
SENDER_TEMPLATE object. Information about the user
that is responsible for the flow is included in the
POLICY_DATA object. The usage of the POLICY_DATA
object is currently not available in most RSVP implementa-
tions, but it is defined within the RSVP standards. The nec-
essary information is extracted from the RSVP message
and processed by the firewall in the following manner:
• The information about the upcoming flow are extracted
from the RSVP message.
• The informations are compared with the firewall security
policy. The firewall checks, if the desired communica-
tion endpoints are valid and the user is authorized for
communication. (Task 1.1,1.2,1.4 of the basic firewall.
Task 1.3 is not performed by the firewall, this task is
now performed by the application).
• The firewall checks whether the negotiated communica-
tion parameters match with the policy overlay.
• The firewall creates the filter rules using the information
Figure 2 - RSVP session establishment
















from the RSVP packets. Depending on the used firewall
type, several rules might be necessary to enable one
flow.
Rules that are not needed anymore have to be removed
properly. RSVP provides a soft state characteristic. The
applications have to take care of the implemented QoS res-
ervations. They have to refresh their reservations periodi-
cally by sending appropriate messages. If the refresh
messages are not sent, the implemented reservations in the
network nodes are removed. This feature is also used
within the firewall to remove rules that are not needed any-
more. Alternatively applications might send a TEAR mes-
sage to remove the implemented QoS parameters explicitly.
In this case, the TEAR message is used by the firewall to
remove the rules.
4.3.3 Signalling Part. The signalling part is implemented
by using an RSVP implementation (in the application and
on the firewall) that supports basic security as defined in
Section 5. The signalling part uses the standard RSVP sig-
nalling mechanisms.
4.4 Limitations and open Questions
The additional signalling between applications and the
firewall brings up performance questions. It is shown in [7]
that the RSVP signalling is performant enough to be used
even for large number of concurrent sessions.
This paper does not cover the problem domain “NAT
functionality”, which has to be considered. For NAT func-
tions, additional RSVP objects have to be designed to sig-
nal appropriate information between application and
firewall. There are also other fields which have to be inves-
tigated, e.g. multicast, real-time operation, extensibility.
5.  Security Mechanisms in RSVP
Security can be divided into three major issues that can
be distinguished and for all of them solutions within RSVP
exist.
• Authentication: In [8] an identity representation for
RSVP is introduced. This information is placed in the
POLICY_DATA object.
• Integrity: In [9] the optional INTEGRITY object is
defined, which carries information to ensure the integrity
of the RSVP message.
• Confidentiality: IPsec [10] can be used in conjunction
with RSVP to provide confidentiality.
Authentication and Integrity must be provided to be able
to perform the basic firewall Tasks (Section 3.1). Confiden-
tiality is not necessary, because an intruder can either look
at the RSVP message content or the subsequent communi-
cation. Communication relations can be determined by an
intruder anyway. If the POLICY_DATA object and the
INTEGRITY object is used, RSVP can be considered
secure and capable to carry information to configure a fire-
wall. A more detailed analysis of the security mechanisms
in RSVP regarding firewall control can be found in [11].
6.  Communication Example
To make the previous described concept more vivid, a
real-world examples is explained in this section. In the cho-
sen example, RealAudio reflects a currently often used
application.
The signalling between
a client, the firewall and
a server for a RealAu-
dio communication is
shown in Figure 4 and
described below. The
communication starts
with an RTSP [12] con-
nection from the client
to the well-known port
(554) on the server.
This connection is used
to negotiate dynamic
parameters, e.g. ports,
for the upcoming media
data transmission using
RTCP/RTP [13] over
UDP. With our suggestion to use RSVP for signalling, the
following situation arise:
• The receiver establishes a RTSP connection via TCP to
the server through the firewall, using a predefined rule.
• After negotiating the parameters for the media streams,
the sender initiates the data transmission. For this pur-
pose the sender sends two PATH messages.
• The informations in the PATH messages are inserted in
the ConnectionCache (untrusted external sender).
• The receiver replies with two RESV messages.
• The firewall receives and extracts sender and receiver
port and address and the underlying protocol from the
message. If the POLICY_DATA object is present, the
user can be identified as well.
• The integrity of the message is checked as well as the
authentication. If the verification succeeds, a new rule is
created and the parameters for the connection are
updated in the ConnectionCache.
• The arriving UDP streams match now the criteria in the
rulesets from the firewall.
• After closing the RealAudio session, the specific firewall
rules time out or are removed (TEAR message).
The use of RSVP allows to get all necessary information
for the creation, installation and deletion of temporary fire-
wall rules.













7.  Related Work
There are some frameworks available, that can be used to
handle applications within a firewall in a generic way.
These frameworks are based on a signalling between the
applications and the firewall. Some of these frameworks
are currently investigated and proposed in the standardiza-
tion organizations [16] [17] [18]. An other well known
method, SOCKS is described in [15]. Most of these frame-
works try to cover both firewall problem domains (“Open-
ing and closing paths” and “NAT functionality”), which
makes sense because these problem domains mostly show
up together and are related to the same physical device.
Our approach is also based on a signalling between the
communication endpoints (applications) and the firewall.
The differences between our approach and the described
existing solutions are the following. An existing protocol is
used, namely RSVP. In the passive mode, information that
is already available is used. No additional effort at the cli-
ent side is necessary to solve the firewall problem domain
“Opening and closing paths”. Our approach is more gen-
eral, because it is not application specific and can deal with
“modern” applications. Our approach is more integrating,
because two related problems can be solved (QoS and
QoP) using one framework.
8.  Conclusion
We have shown that RSVP can be used as generic fire-
wall framework. Compared to other existing frameworks
this approach is based on already established and used
methods. By combining both approaches, RSVP signalling
and explicit firewall control, both benefit. Firewalls will
benefit if they are able to provide a generic interface, that is
well known and is already accepted by application develop-
ers. RSVP benefits by providing an additional feature and
becoming thereby a more integrating signalling approach.
Security can be seen as a QoS parameter and it is sound to
use the same protocol to signal all QoS parameters. We
have shown that RSVP already provides a lot of mecha-
nisms that are also necessary to build a firewall framework.
Few extensions to RSVP are necessary to also cover the
task “firewall control”.
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